

# LANGUAGE & SYMBOLIC POWER



Pierre Bourdieu

# Language and Symbolic Power

---

Pierre Bourdieu

*Edited and Introduced by  
John B. Thompson*

Translated by Gino Raymond and  
Matthew Adamson

Polity Press

Copyright © General Introduction, Introductions to Parts I and II, chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10: Librairie Arthème Fayard 1982  
 Copyright © Appendix to Part I, chapters 7, 8, 9, 11: Pierre Bourdieu 1983, 1977, 1981, 1984, 1984 *91144219*  
 Copyright © Editor's Introduction: John B. Thompson 1991  
 This English translation copyright © Polity Press 1991

First published 1991 by Polity Press  
 in association with Basil Blackwell

Editorial office:

Polity Press, 65 Bridge Street, Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Marketing and production:

Basil Blackwell Ltd,  
 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

ISBN 0 7456 0097 2

*British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data*  
 A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.



Typeset in 10½ on 12pt Times New Roman  
 by Wearside Tradespools, Fulwell, Sunderland  
 Printed in Great Britain by  
 T. J. Press Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall.

## Contents

|                                                                                                                |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <i>Preface</i>                                                                                                 | vii |
| <i>Editor's Introduction</i>                                                                                   | 1   |
| <i>General Introduction</i>                                                                                    | 32  |
| <br>                                                                                                           |     |
| <b>Part I The Economy of Linguistic Exchanges</b>                                                              |     |
| 1 Introduction                                                                                                 | 37  |
| 2 The Production and Reproduction of Legitimate Language                                                       | 43  |
| 3 Price Formation and the Anticipation of Profits                                                              | 66  |
| 4 Appendix: <i>Did You Say 'Popular'?</i>                                                                      | 90  |
| <br>                                                                                                           |     |
| <b>Part II The Social Institution of Symbolic Power</b>                                                        |     |
| 1 Introduction                                                                                                 | 105 |
| 2 Authorized Language: <i>The Social Conditions for the Effectiveness of Ritual Discourse</i>                  | 107 |
| 3 Rites of Institution                                                                                         | 117 |
| 4 Description and Prescription: <i>The Conditions of Possibility and the Limits of Political Effectiveness</i> | 127 |
| 5 Censorship and the Imposition of Form                                                                        | 137 |
| <br>                                                                                                           |     |
| <b>Part III Symbolic Power and the Political Field</b>                                                         |     |
| 6 On Symbolic Power                                                                                            | 163 |
| 7 Political Representation: <i>Elements for a Theory of the Political Field</i>                                | 171 |
| 8 Delegation and Political Fetishism                                                                           | 203 |



## Price Formation and the Anticipation of Profits

*Perhaps from force of occupational habit, perhaps by virtue of the calm that is acquired by every important man who is consulted for his advice and who, knowing that he will keep control over the situation, sits back and lets his interlocutor flap and fluster, perhaps also in order to show to advantage the character of his head (which he believed to be Grecian, in spite of his whiskers), while something was being explained to him, M. de Norpois maintained an immobility of expression as absolute as if you had been speaking in front of some classical – and deaf – bust in a museum.*

*Marcel Proust, A la recherche du temps perdu*

Linguistic exchange – a relation of communication between a sender and a receiver, based on enciphering and deciphering, and therefore on the implementation of a code or a generative competence – is also an economic exchange which is established within a particular symbolic relation of power between a producer, endowed with a certain linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a market), and which is capable of procuring a certain material or symbolic profit. In other words, utterances are not only (save in exceptional circumstances) signs to be understood and deciphered; they are also *signs of wealth*, intended to be evaluated and appreciated, and *signs of authority*, intended to be believed and obeyed. Quite apart from the literary (and especially poetic) uses of language, it is rare in everyday life for language to function as a pure instrument of communication. The pursuit of maximum informative efficiency is only exceptionally the

exclusive goal of linguistic production and the distinctly instrumental use of language which it implies generally clashes with the often unconscious pursuit of symbolic profit. For in addition to the information expressly declared, linguistic practice inevitably communicates information about the (differential) manner of communicating, i.e. about the *expressive style*, which, being perceived and appreciated with reference to the universe of theoretically or practically competing styles, takes on a social value and a symbolic efficacy.

### CAPITAL, MARKET AND PRICE

Utterances receive their value (and their sense) only in their relation to a market, characterized by a particular law of price formation. The value of the utterance depends on the relation of power that is concretely established between the speakers' linguistic competences, understood both as their capacity for production and as their capacity for appropriation and appreciation; it depends, in other words, on the capacity of the various agents involved in the exchange to impose the criteria of appreciation most favourable to their own products. This capacity is not determined in linguistic terms alone. It is certain that the relation between linguistic competences – which, as socially classified productive capacities, characterize socially classified linguistic units of production and, as capacities of appropriation and appreciation, define markets that are themselves socially classified – helps to determine the law of price formation that obtains in a particular exchange. But the linguistic relation of power is not completely determined by the prevailing linguistic forces alone: by the virtue of the languages spoken, the speakers who use them and the groups defined by possession of the corresponding competence, the whole social structure is present in each interaction (and thereby in the discourse uttered). That is what is ignored by the interactionist perspective, which treats interaction as a closed world, forgetting that what happens between two persons – between an employer and an employee or, in a colonial situation, between a French speaker and an Arabic speaker or, in the post-colonial situation, between two members of the formerly colonized nation, one Arabic-speaking, one French-speaking – derives its particular form from the objective relation between the corresponding languages or usages, that is, between the groups who speak those languages.

The concern to return to the things themselves and to get a firmer



grip on 'reality', a concern which often inspires the projects of 'micro-sociology', can lead one purely and simply to miss a 'reality' that does not yield to immediate intuition because it lies in structures transcending the interaction which they inform. There is no better example of this than that provided by *strategies of condescension*. Thus a French-language newspaper published in Béarn (a province of south-west France) wrote of the mayor of Pau who, in the course of a ceremony in honour of a Béarnais poet, had addressed the assembled company in Béarnais: 'The audience was greatly moved by this thoughtful gesture'.<sup>1</sup> In order for an audience of people whose mother tongue is Béarnais to perceive as a 'thoughtful gesture' the fact that a Béarnais mayor should speak to them in Béarnais, they must tacitly recognize the unwritten law which prescribes French as the only acceptable language for formal speeches in formal situations. The strategy of condescension consists in deriving *profit* from the objective relation of power between the languages that confront one another in practice (even and especially when French is absent) in the very act of symbolically negating that relation, namely, the hierarchy of the languages and of those who speak them. Such a strategy is possible whenever the objective disparity between the persons present (that is, between their social properties) is sufficiently known and recognized by everyone (particularly those involved in the interaction, as agents or spectators) so that the symbolic negation of the hierarchy (by using the 'common touch', for instance) enables the speaker to combine the profits linked to the undiminished hierarchy with those derived from the distinctly symbolic negation of the hierarchy – not the least of which is the strengthening of the hierarchy implied by the recognition accorded to the way of using the hierarchical relation. In reality, the Béarnais mayor can create this condescension effect only because, as mayor of a large town, attesting to his urbanity, he also possesses all the titles (he is a qualified professor) which guarantee his rightful participation in the 'superiority' of the 'superior' language (no one, and especially not a provincial journalist, would think of praising the mayor's French in the same way as his Béarnais, since he is a qualified, licensed speaker who speaks 'good quality' French by definition, *ex officio*). What is praised as 'good quality' Béarnais', coming from the mouth of the legitimate speaker of the legitimate language, would be totally devoid of value – and furthermore would be sociologically impossible in a formal situation – coming from the mouth of a peasant, such as the man who, in order to explain why he did not dream of becoming mayor of his village even though he had

obtained the biggest share of the vote, said (in French) that he 'didn't know how to speak' (meaning French), implying a definition of linguistic competence that is entirely sociological. One can see in passing that strategies for the subversion of objective hierarchies in the sphere of language, as in the sphere of culture, are *also* likely to be strategies of condescension, reserved for those who are sufficiently confident of their position in the objective hierarchies to be able to deny them without appearing to be ignorant or incapable of satisfying their demands. If Béarnais (or, elsewhere, Creole) is one day spoken on formal occasions, this will be by virtue of its takeover by speakers of the dominant language, who have enough claims to linguistic legitimacy (at least in the eyes of their interlocutors) to avoid being suspected of resorting to the stigmatized language *faute de mieux*.

The relations of power that obtain in the linguistic market, and whose variations determine the variations in the price that the same discourse may receive on different markets, are manifested and realized in the fact that certain agents are incapable of applying to the linguistic products offered, either by themselves or others, the criteria that are most favourable to their own products. This effect of the imposition of legitimacy is greater – and the laws of the market are more favourable to the products offered by the holders of the greatest linguistic competence – when the use of the legitimate language is more imperative, that is, when the situation is more formal (and when it is more favourable, therefore, to those who are more or less formally delegated to speak), and when consumers grant more complete recognition to the legitimate language and legitimate competence (but a recognition which is relatively independent of their knowledge of that language). In other words, the more formal the market is, the more practically congruent with the norms of the legitimate language, the more it is dominated by the dominant, i.e. by the holders of the legitimate competence, authorized to speak with authority. Linguistic competence is not a simple technical capacity but a statutory capacity with which the technical capacity is generally paired, if only because it imposes the acquisition of the latter through the effect of statutory attribution (*noblesse oblige*), as opposed to the commonly held belief that regards technical capacity as the basis for statutory capacity. Legitimate competence is the statutorily recognized capacity of an authorized person – an 'authority' – to use, on formal occasions, the legitimate (i.e. formal) language, the authorized, authoritative language, speech that is accredited, worthy of being believed, or, in a word,



*performative*, claiming (with the greatest chances of success) to be effective. Given that legitimate competence, thus defined, implies the effectiveness of the performative, one can understand how certain experiments in social psychology have been able to establish that the efficacy of an utterance, the power of conviction which is granted to it, depends on the *pronunciation* (and secondarily the vocabulary) of the person who utters it; that is, through this particularly reliable measure of statutory competence, it depends on the authority of the speaker. The practical evaluation of the symbolic relation of power that determines the criteria of evaluation prevailing in the market concerned takes into account the specifically linguistic properties of discourse only in so far as they express the social authority and social competence of those who utter them. They do so in the same way as other non-linguistic properties such as the character of the voice (nasalization or pharynxization), a durable disposition of the vocal apparatus that is one of the most powerful of social markers, and all of the more overtly social qualities such as aristocratic and academic titles: clothing, especially uniforms and formal dress; institutional attributes like the priest's pulpit, the professor's platform, the orator's rostrum and microphone, all of which place the legitimate speaker in a pre-eminent position and structure the interaction through the spatial structure which they impose on it; and, finally, the very composition of the group in which the exchange occurs.

Thus the more formal a situation is, the more likely it is that the dominant linguistic competence will function in a particular market as linguistic capital capable of imposing the law of price formation which is the most favourable to its products and of procuring the corresponding symbolic profit. For the more formal the situation is, the more it is able to impose by itself alone the recognition of the legitimacy of the dominant mode of expression, converting the optional variants (at least on the level of pronunciation) which characterize it into imperative rules, *'de rigueur'* (like black ties at formal dinners), making the recipients of these linguistic products more inclined to know and recognize the legitimacy of this mode of expression, even outside the constraints of the formal situation. In other words, the more these different conditions converge and the higher the degree to which this occurs on a market, the narrower the gap between the values accorded in practice to the linguistic products which confront each other on that market and the theoretical value which would be attributed to them, in a hypothetical unified market, in relation to their position in a complete system of linguistic styles.

Conversely, as the degree of formality in an exchange situation and the degree to which the exchange is dominated by highly authorized speakers diminish, so the law of price formation tends to become less unfavourable to the products of dominated linguistic habitus.

It is true that the definition of the symbolic relation of power which is constitutive of the market can be the subject of *negotiation* and that the market can be manipulated, within certain limits, by a metadiscourse concerning the conditions of use of discourse. This includes, for example, the expressions which are used to introduce or excuse speech which is too free or shocking ('with your permission', 'if I may say so', 'if you'll pardon the expression', 'with all due respect', etc.) or those which reinforce, through explicit articulation, the candour enjoyed on a particular market ('off the record', 'strictly between ourselves', etc.). But it goes without saying that the capacity to manipulate is greater the more capital one possesses, as is shown by the strategies of condescension. It is also true that the unification of the market is never so complete as to prevent dominated individuals from finding, in the space provided by private life, among friends, markets where the laws of price formation which apply to more formal markets are suspended.<sup>2</sup> In these private exchanges between homogeneous partners, the 'illegitimate' linguistic products are judged according to criteria which, since they are adjusted to their principles of production, free them from the necessarily comparative logic of distinction and of value. Despite this, the formal law, which is thus provisionally suspended rather than truly transgressed,<sup>3</sup> remains valid, and it re-imposes itself on dominated individuals once they leave the unregulated areas where they can be outspoken (and where they can spend all their lives), as is shown by the fact that it governs the production of their spokespersons as soon as they are placed in a formal situation. It would be quite mistaken, therefore, to see a 'true' popular language in the use of language which obtains in this oasis of freedom, where one has licence (a typical 'dictionary word') because one is among friends and not forced to 'watch oneself'. It is also true that popular competence, when confronted with a formal market, like the one constituted by a linguistic survey or investigation (unless specific precautions are taken), is, as it were, annihilated. The reality of linguistic legitimacy consists precisely in the fact that dominated individuals are always under the *potential jurisdiction* of formal law, even when they spend all their lives, like the thief described by Weber, beyond its reach, so that when placed in a formal situation they are doomed to silence or to the broken discourse which



linguistic investigation also often records.

This means that the productions of the same linguistic habitus vary according to the market and that any linguistic observation records a discourse which is the product of the relationship between a linguistic competence and the particular market constituted by the linguistic investigation. This market has a high degree of tension since the laws of price formation which govern it are related to those of the academic market. All attempts to pin down the variables that could explain the variations thus recorded run the risk of overlooking the effect of the investigative situation itself, *a hidden variable which is doubtless the source of the differential weight of different variables*. Those who, wishing to break with linguistic abstractions, try to establish statistically the social factors of linguistic competence (measured by this or that phonological, lexical or syntactic index) are only going half-way: they are in fact forgetting that the different factors measured in a particular market situation – that created by the inquiry – could, in a different situation, have very different relative weights, and that what is important therefore is to determine how the explanatory weights of the different factors which determine competence vary according to the market situation (which would require the development of a proper experimental project).

#### SYMBOLIC CAPITAL: A RECOGNIZED POWER

The question of performative utterances becomes clearer if one sees it as a particular case of the effects of symbolic domination, which occurs in all linguistic exchanges. The linguistic relation of power is never defined solely by the relation between the linguistic competences present. And the weight of different agents depends on their symbolic capital, i.e. on the *recognition*, institutionalized or not, that they receive from a group. Symbolic imposition – that kind of magical efficacy which not only the command and the password, but also ritual discourse or a simple injunction, or even threats or insults, purport to exercise – can function only if there is a convergence of social conditions which are altogether distinct from the strictly linguistic logic of discourse. For the philosopher's language to be granted the importance it claims, there has to be a convergence of the social conditions which enable it to secure from others a recognition of the importance which it attributes to itself.<sup>4</sup> Equally, the setting up of a ritual exchange, such as a mass, presupposes, among other things, that all the social conditions are in place to

ensure the production of appropriate senders and receivers, who are therefore agreed among themselves. It is certainly the case that the symbolic efficacy of religious language is threatened when the set of mechanisms capable of ensuring the reproduction of the relationship of recognition, which is the basis of its authority, ceases to function. This is also true of any relation of symbolic imposition, even of the one implied by the use of the legitimate language which, as such, involves the claim to be heard, believed and obeyed, and which can exercise its specific efficacy only as long as it can count on the effectiveness of all the mechanisms, analysed above, which secure the reproduction of the dominant language and the recognition of its legitimacy. One may note, in passing, that the source of the profit of distinction, procured by any use of the legitimate language, derives from the totality of the social universe and the relations of domination that give structure to it, although one of the most important constituents of this profit lies in the fact that it appears to be based on the qualities of the person alone.

Austin's account of performative utterances cannot be restricted to the sphere of linguistics. The magical efficacy of these *acts of institution* is inseparable from the existence of an institution defining the conditions (regarding the agent, the time or place, etc.) which have to be fulfilled for the magic of words to operate. As is indicated in the examples analysed by Austin, these 'conditions of felicity' are social conditions, and the person who wishes to proceed *felicitously* with the christening of a ship or of a person must be *entitled* to do so, in the same way that, to be able to give an order, one must have a recognized authority over the recipient of that order. It is true that linguists have often rushed to find, in Austin's inconsistent definition of the performative, an excuse for dismissing the problem which Austin had set them, in order to return to a narrowly linguistic definition that ignores the market effect. They did this by distinguishing between explicit performatives, which are necessarily self-verifying since they represent in themselves the accomplishment of the act, and performatives conceived more broadly to mean statements that are used to accomplish an act other than the simple fact of saying something, or, to put it more simply, the difference between a properly linguistic act (e.g. declaring the meeting open) and the extra-linguistic act (opening the meeting by the fact of declaring it open). In this way, they justified to themselves the rejection of any analysis of the social conditions in which performative utterances function. The conditions of felicity discussed by Austin concern only the extra-linguistic act; only to open the meeting effectively does one



need to be entitled to do so, as anyone can declare it open, even if his declaration remains totally ineffective.<sup>5</sup>

Was it necessary to employ so much ingenuity to discover that when my doing consists in my saying, what I do is necessarily what I say? But by pushing to the limit the consequences of the distinction between the linguistic and the extra-linguistic, on which it purports to base its autonomy (notably with regard to sociology), pragmatics demonstrates by *reductio ad absurdum* that illocutionary acts as described by Austin are acts of institution that cannot be sanctioned unless they have, in some way, the whole social order behind them. 'Whereas one clearly must be "entitled" to open the meeting, it is not necessary to be in a position of superiority to give an order; a soldier can give an order to his commanding officer, even though his order has little chance of being obeyed'.<sup>6</sup> Or, again: 'To claim legitimately to open the meeting, one needs to be authorized by the institution and not everyone is; but everyone has the authority to accomplish a speech act like an order, so that everyone can claim to accomplish such an act'.<sup>7</sup> The construction of these 'pure' performatives, represented by explicit performatives, has the virtue of bringing out a *contrario* the presuppositions of ordinary performatives, which imply a reference to the social conditions for their success. From a strictly linguistic point of view, anyone can say anything and the private can order his captain to 'clean the latrines'; but from a sociological point of view (the one adopted in fact by Austin when he reflects on the conditions of felicity), it is clear that not anyone can assert anything, or else does so at his peril, as with an insult. 'Anybody can shout in the public square, "I decree a general mobilization," and as it cannot be an *act* because the requisite authority is lacking, such an utterance is no more than *words*; it reduces itself to futile clamour, childishness, or lunacy'.<sup>8</sup> The logical exercise of separating the act of speech from its conditions of execution shows, through the absurdities that this abstraction engenders, that the performative utterance, as an act of institution, cannot socio-logically exist independently of the institution which gives it its *raison d'être*, and if it were to be produced in spite of everything, it would be socially deprived of sense.<sup>9</sup> Since an order, or even a password, can work only if it is backed up by the order of things and its accomplishment depends on all the relations of order which define the social order, one would have to be crazy, as they say, to dream up and give an order for which the conditions of felicity are not fulfilled. The anticipated conditions of felicity help to determine the utterance by allowing it to be thought of and experienced as

reasonable and realistic. Only a hopeless soldier (or a 'pure' linguist) could imagine that it was possible to give his captain an order. The performative utterance implies 'an overt claim to possess such or such power',<sup>10</sup> a claim that is more or less recognized and therefore more or less sanctioned socially. This claim to act on the social world through words, i.e. magically, is more or less crazy or reasonable depending on whether it is more or less based on the objectivity of the social world.<sup>11</sup> Thus we can counterpose two acts of magical naming that are, socially, very unequally guaranteed: the insult ('you're only a professor') which, lacking authorization, risks rebounding against its author, and the official naming or 'nomination' ('I appoint you professor'), powerfully invested with all the authority of the group and capable of instituting a legitimate, that is, universally recognized, identity.

The limiting case of the performative utterance is the legal act which, when it is pronounced, as it should be, by someone who has the right to do so,<sup>12</sup> i.e. by an agent acting on behalf of a whole group, can replace action with speech, which will, as they say, have an effect: the judge need say no more than 'I find you guilty' because there is a set of agents and institutions which guarantee that the sentence will be executed. The inquiry into the specifically linguistic principle behind the 'illocutionary power' of discourse thus gives way to the distinctly sociological inquiry into the conditions in which an individual agent can find himself and his speech invested with such power. The real source of the magic of performative utterances lies in the mystery of ministry, i.e. the delegation by virtue of which an individual – king, priest or spokesperson – is mandated to speak and act on behalf of a group, thus constituted in him and by him.<sup>13</sup> More precisely, it lies in the social conditions of the *institution* of the ministry, which constitutes the legitimate representative as an agent capable of acting on the social world through words, by instituting him as a medium between the group and the social world; and it does that, among other things, by equipping him with the signs and the insignia aimed at underlining the fact that he is not acting in his own name and under his own authority.

There is no symbolic power without the symbolism of power. Symbolic attributes – as is well illustrated in the paradigmatic case of the *skeptron* and the sanctions against the improper wearing of uniforms – are a public display and thereby an officialization of the contract of delegation: the ermine and the robe declare that the judge or the doctor is recognized as having just cause (in the collective recognition) for declaring himself



judge or doctor, that his imposture – in the sense of the pretension expressed by his appearance – is legitimate. The competence that is specifically linguistic – the Latin once spoken by doctors or the eloquence of the spokesperson – is also one of the manifestations of competence in the sense of the right to speech and to power through speech. There is a whole dimension of authorized language, its rhetoric, syntax, vocabulary and even pronunciation, which exists purely to underline the authority of its author and the trust he demands. In this respect, style is an element of the *mechanism*, in the Pascalian sense, through which language aims to produce and impose the representation of its own importance and thereby help to ensure its own credibility.<sup>14</sup> The symbolic efficacy of the discourse of authority always depends, in part, on the linguistic competence of the person who utters it. This is more true, of course, when the authority of the speaker is less clearly institutionalized. It follows that the exercise of symbolic power is accompanied by work on the *form* of discourse which, as is clearly demonstrated in the case of poets in archaic societies, has the purpose of demonstrating the orator's mastery and gaining him the recognition of the group. (This logic is also found in the popular rhetoric of insults which seeks, by flagrant overstatement and the regulated deformation of ritual formulas, to produce the expressive accomplishment which allows one to 'get those laughing on one's side'.)

Thus, just as the relation to the market defines, in the case of constatives, the conditions of acceptability and thereby the very form of the discourse, so too the relation to the possibilities offered by a particular market determines, in the case of performative utterances, the conditions of felicity. One must therefore assert, against all the forms of autonomization of a distinctly linguistic order, that all speech is produced for and through the market to which it owes its existence and its most specific properties.

#### THE ANTICIPATION OF PROFITS

Since a discourse can only exist, in the form in which it exists, so long as it is not simply grammatically correct but also, and above all, socially acceptable, i.e. heard, believed, and therefore effective within a given state of relations of production and circulation, it follows that the scientific analysis of discourse must take into account the laws of price formation which characterize the market concerned or, in other words, the laws defining the social conditions of acceptability (which include the specifically linguistic laws of grammaticality). In reality, the conditions of reception envisaged are part of the conditions of production, and anticipation of the sanctions of

the market helps to determine the production of the discourse. This anticipation, which bears no resemblance to a conscious calculation, is an aspect of the linguistic habitus which, being the product of a prolonged and primordial relation to the laws of a certain market, tends to function as a practical sense of the acceptability and the probable value of one's own linguistic productions and those of others on different markets.<sup>15</sup> It is this sense of acceptability, and not some form of rational calculation oriented towards the maximization of symbolic profits, which, by encouraging one to take account of the probable value of discourse during the process of production, determines corrections and all forms of self-censorship – the concessions one makes to a social world by accepting to make oneself acceptable in it.

Since linguistic signs are also goods destined to be given a price by powers capable of providing credit (varying according to the laws of the market on which they are placed), linguistic production is inevitably affected by the anticipation of market sanctions: all verbal expressions – whether words exchanged between friends, the bureaucratic discourse of an authorized spokesperson or the academic discourse of a scientific paper – are marked by their conditions of reception and owe some of their properties (even at a grammatical level) to the fact that, on the basis of a practical anticipation of the laws of the market concerned, their authors, most often unwittingly, and without expressly seeking to do so, try to maximize the symbolic profit they can obtain from practices which are, inseparably, oriented towards communication and exposed to evaluation.<sup>16</sup> This means that the market fixes the price for a linguistic product, the nature, and therefore the objective value, of which the practical anticipation of this price helped to determine; and it means that the practical relation to the market (ease, timidity, tension, embarrassment, silence, etc.), which helps to establish the market sanction, thus provides an apparent justification for the sanction by which it is partly produced.

In the case of symbolic production, the constraint exercised by the market via the anticipation of possible profit naturally takes the form of an anticipated *censorship*, of a self-censorship which determines not only the manner of saying, that is, the choice of language – 'code switching' in situations of bilingualism – or the 'level' of language, but also what it will be possible or not possible to say.<sup>17</sup>

Everything happens as if, in each particular situation, the linguistic norm (the law of price formation) is imposed by the holder of the competence



which is closest to the legitimate competence, i.e. by the dominant speaker in the interaction, and in a way that is all the more rigorous when the exchange has a higher degree of formality (in public, in a formal setting, etc.). It is as if the effect of censorship which is exercised over the dominated speaker and the necessity for him to adopt the legitimate mode of expression (French in the case of a *patois* speaker), or to come close to it, is more powerfully experienced, all other things being equal, when the disparity between the different kinds of capital is greater – whereas this constraint disappears between holders of an equivalent symbolic and linguistic capital, for example between peasants. Situations of bilingualism enable one to observe quasi-experimentally how the language used varies according to the relation between the speakers (and their instruments of expression), analysed in terms of the structure of the distribution of specifically linguistic capital and of other kinds of capital. Thus, in a series of interactions observed in 1963 in a small Béarnais town, the same person (an elderly woman living in one of the neighbouring villages) first used a '*patois*-French' to a young woman shopkeeper in the town, who was originally from another, larger town in the Béarn (and who, being more of a 'city-dweller', might not understand Béarnais or could feign ignorance). The next moment, she spoke in Béarnais to a woman who lived in that town but who was originally from the villages and more or less of her own age; then she used a French that was strongly 'corrected' to a minor town official; and, finally, she spoke in Béarnais to a roadworker in the town, originally from the villages and about her age. It is clear that the interviewer, as an 'educated' city-dweller, will only encounter strongly corrected French or silence; and if he uses Béarnais himself, this may well ease the tension of the exchange, but, whatever his intentions, it cannot fail to function as a strategy of condescension likely to create a situation no less artificial than the initial relationship.

The practical cognition and recognition of the immanent laws of a market and the sanctions through which they are manifested determine the strategic modifications of discourse, whether they concern the effort to 'correct' a devalued pronunciation in the presence of representatives of the legitimate pronunciation and, more generally, all the corrections which tend to valorize the linguistic product by a more intense mobilization of the available resources, or, conversely, the tendency to resort to a less complex syntax, to the short phrases which social psychologists have observed in adults when they address children. Discourses are always to some extent *euphemisms* inspired by the concern to 'speak well', to 'speak properly', to produce the products that respond to the demands of a certain market; they are *compromise formations* resulting from a transaction between the expressive interest (what is to be said) and the censorship inherent in

particular relations of linguistic production (whether it is the structure of linguistic interaction or the structure of a specialized field), a censorship which is imposed on a speaker or writer endowed with a certain social competence, that is, a more or less significant symbolic power over these relations of symbolic power.<sup>18</sup>

Variations in the *form* of discourse, and more precisely the degree to which it is controlled, monitored and refined in form (*formal*), thus depend, on the one hand, on the *objective tension* of the market, that is, on the degree of formality of the situation and, in the case of an interaction, on the extent of the social distance (in the structure of the distribution of linguistic and other kinds of capital) between the sender and the receiver, or the respective groups to which they belong; and, on the other hand, on the 'sensitivity' of the speaker to this tension and the censorship it implies, as well as the closely related aptitude to respond to a high degree of tension with an expression which is highly controlled, and therefore strongly euphemized. In other words, the form and the content of a discourse depend on the relation between a habitus (which is itself the product of sanctions on a market with a given level of tension), and a market defined by a level of tension which is more or less heightened, hence by the severity of the sanctions it inflicts on those who pay insufficient attention to 'correctness' and to 'the imposition of form' which formal usage presupposes.

It is, therefore, not clear how one could understand, other than in terms of variations in the tension of the market, the *stylistic variations* of which Bally gives a good example,<sup>19</sup> with a series of expressions (represented here by approximate English equivalents) which are seemingly interchangeable, since they are all oriented towards the same practical result: 'Come!', 'Do come!', 'Wouldn't you like to come?', 'You will come, won't you?', 'Do say you'll come', 'Suppose you came?', 'You ought to come', 'Come here', 'Here!' – to which could be added 'Will you come?', 'You will come', 'Kindly come', 'Would you be so good as to come', 'Be a sport, do come', 'Come please!', 'Come, I beg you', 'I hope you will come', 'I'm counting on you . . . ' and so on *ad infinitum*. Although such expressions are theoretically equivalent, they are not so in practice. Each of them, when used appropriately, achieves the optimum form of the compromise between the expressive intention – in this case, insistence, which runs the risk of appearing as unreasonable intrusion or unacceptable pressure – and the censorship inherent in a more or less asymmetrical social relationship, by making maximum use of the available resources, whether they are already objectified



and codified, like expressions of politeness, or remain in a virtual state. This is as much insistence as one can 'allow oneself' to exert, so long as the 'forms' are observed. Where 'If you would do me the honour of coming' is appropriate, 'You ought to come' would be out of place, because too off-hand, and 'Will you come?' would be distinctly 'crude'. In social formalism, as in magical formalism, there is only one formula in each case which 'works'. And the whole labour of politeness strives to get as close as possible to the perfect formula that would be immediately self-evident if one had a perfect mastery of the market situation.

Form and the information it imparts condense and symbolize the entire structure of the social relation from which they derive their existence and their efficacy (the celebrated 'illocutionary force'). What is called tact or adroitness consists in the art of taking account of the relative positions of the sender and the receiver in the hierarchy of different kinds of capital, and also of sex and age, and of the limits inscribed in this relation, ritually transgressing them, if need be, by means of euphemization. The attenuation of the injunction, reduced to zero in 'Here', 'Come', or 'Come here', is more marked in 'If you would be so good as to come this way'. The form used to neutralize 'impoliteness' may be a simple interrogative ('Will you come?'), or a doubly delicate negative question ('Won't you come?'), which acknowledges the possibility of refusal. It may be a formula of insistence which pretends not to insist by declaring both the possibility of refusal and the value set on compliance, in which case it may take a colloquial form, appropriate between peers ('Do me a favour and come'), a 'stilted' form ('Would you be so kind as to come'), even an obsequious form ('If you would do me the honour of coming'); or it may be a metalinguistic inquiry into the very legitimacy of the question ('May I ask you to come?').

What our social sense detects in a form which is a kind of symbolic expression of all the sociologically pertinent features of the market situation is precisely that which oriented the production of the discourse, namely, the entire set of characteristics of the social relation obtaining between the interlocutors and the expressive capacities which the speaker was able to invest in the process of euphemization. The interdependence between linguistic forms and the structure of the social relation within and for which it is produced can be seen clearly, in French, in the oscillations between the forms of address, *vous* and *tu*, which sometimes occur when the objective structure of the relation between two speakers (e.g. disparity in age or social status) conflicts with the length and continuity of their

acquaintance, and therefore with the intimacy and familiarity of their interaction. It then seems as if they are feeling their way towards a readjustment of the mode of expression and of the social relation through spontaneous or calculated slips of the tongue and progressive lapses, which often culminate in a sort of linguistic contract designed to establish the new expressive order on an official basis: 'Let's use *tu*.' But the subordination of the form of discourse to the form of the social relationship in which it is used is most strikingly apparent in situations of *stylistic collision*, when the speaker is confronted with a socially heterogeneous audience or simply with two interlocutors socially and culturally so far apart that the sociologically exclusive modes of expression called for, which are normally produced through more or less conscious adjustment in separate social spaces, cannot be produced simultaneously.

What guides linguistic production is not the degree of tension of the market or, more precisely, its degree of formality, defined in the abstract, for any speaker, but rather the relation between a degree of 'average' objective tension and a linguistic habitus itself characterized by a particular degree of sensitivity to the tension of the market; or, in other words, it is the anticipation of profits, which can scarcely be called a subjective anticipation since it is the product of the encounter between an objective circumstance, that is, the average probability of success, and an incorporated objectivity, that is, the disposition towards a more or less rigorous evaluation of that probability.<sup>20</sup> The practical quasi-corporeal sense of the reality of the penalties is a practical quasi-corporeal sense of the reality of the objective relation between a certain linguistic and social competence and a certain market, through which this relation is accomplished. It can range from the certainty of a positive sanction, which is the basis of *certitudo sui*, of *self-assurance*, to the certainty of a negative sanction, which induces surrender and silence, through all the intermediate forms of insecurity and timidity.

#### THE LINGUISTIC HABITUS AND BODILY HEXIS

The definition of acceptability is found not in the situation but in the relationship between a market and a habitus, which itself is the product of the whole history of its relations with markets. The habitus is, indeed, linked to the market no less through its conditions of acquisition than through its conditions of use. We have not learned to speak simply by hearing a certain kind of speech spoken



but also by speaking, thus by offering a determinate form of speech on a determinate market. This occurs through exchanges within a family occupying a particular position in the social space and thus presenting the child's imitative propensity with models and sanctions that diverge more or less from legitimate usage.<sup>21</sup> And we have learned the value that the products offered on this primary market, together with the authority which it provides, receive on other markets (like that of the school). The system of successive reinforcements or refutations has thus constituted in each one of us a certain sense of the social value of linguistic usages and of the relation between the different usages and the different markets, which organizes all subsequent perceptions of linguistic products, tending to endow it with considerable stability. (We know, in general terms, that the effects that a new experience can have on the *habitus* depend on the relation of practical 'compatibility' between this experience and the experiences that have already been assimilated by the *habitus*, in the form of schemes of production and evaluation, and that, in the process of selective re-interpretation which results from this dialectic, the informative efficacy of all new experiences tends to diminish continuously.) This linguistic 'sense of place' governs the degree of constraint which a given field will bring to bear on the production of discourse, imposing silence or a hyper-controlled language on some people while allowing others the liberties of a language that is securely established. This means that competence, which is acquired in a social context and through practice, is inseparable from the practical mastery of a usage of language and the practical mastery of situations in which this usage of language is *socially acceptable*. The sense of the value of one's own linguistic products is a fundamental dimension of the sense of knowing the place which one occupies in the social space. One's original relation with different markets and the experience of the sanctions applied to one's own productions, together with the experience of the price attributed to one's own body, are doubtless some of the mediations which help to constitute that *sense of one's own social worth* which governs the practical relation to different markets (shyness, confidence, etc.) and, more generally, one's whole physical posture in the social world.

While every speaker is both a producer and a consumer of his own linguistic productions, not all speakers, as we have seen, are able to apply to their own products the schemes according to which they were produced. The unhappy relation which the *petits bourgeois* have to their own productions (and especially with regard to their

pronunciation, which, as Labov shows, they judge with particular severity); their especially keen sensitivity to the tension of the market and, by the same token, to linguistic correction in themselves and in others,<sup>22</sup> which pushes them to hyper-correction; their insecurity, which reaches a state of paroxysm on formal occasions, creating 'incorrectness' through hyper-correction or the embarrassingly rash utterances prompted by an artificial confidence – are all things that result from a divorce between the schemes of production and the schemes of evaluation. Divided against themselves, so to speak, the *petits bourgeois* are those who are both the most 'conscious' of the objective truth of their products (the one defined in the academic hypothesis of the perfectly unified market) and the most determined to reject it, deny it, and contradict it by their efforts. As is very evident in this case, what expresses itself through the linguistic *habitus* is the whole class *habitus* of which it is one dimension, which means in fact, the position that is occupied, synchronically and diachronically, in the social structure.

As we have seen, hyper-correction is inscribed in the logic of pretension which leads the *petits bourgeois* to attempt to appropriate prematurely, at the cost of constant tension, the properties of those who are dominant. The particular intensity of the insecurity and anxiety felt by women of the *petite bourgeoisie* with regard to language (and equally with regard to cosmetics or personal appearance) can be understood in the framework of the same logic: destined, by the division of labour between the sexes, to seek social mobility through their capacity for symbolic production and consumption, they are even more inclined to invest in the acquisition of legitimate competences. The linguistic practices of the *petite bourgeoisie* could not fail to strike those who, like Labov, observed them on the particularly tense markets created by linguistic investigation. Situated at the maximum point of subjective tension through their particular sensitivity to objective tension (which is the effect of an especially marked disparity between recognition and cognition), the *petits bourgeois* are distinct from members of the lower classes who, lacking the means to exercise the liberties of plain speaking, which they reserve for private usage, have no choice but to opt for the broken forms of a borrowed and clumsy language or to escape into abstinence and silence. But the *petits bourgeois* are no less distinct from the members of the dominant class, whose linguistic *habitus* (especially if they were born in that class) is the *realization of the norm* and who can express all the self-confidence that is associated with a situation where the principles of evaluation and the



principles of production coincide perfectly.<sup>23</sup>

In this case, as, at the other extreme, in the case of popular outspokenness on the popular market, the demands of the market and the dispositions of the habitus are perfectly attuned; the law of the market does not need to be imposed by means of constraint or external censorship since it is accomplished through the relation to the market which is its incorporated form. When the objective structures which it confronts coincide with those which have produced it, the habitus anticipates the objective demands of the field. Such is the basis of the most frequent and best concealed form of censorship, the kind which is applied by placing, in positions which imply the right to speak, those agents who are endowed with expressive dispositions that are 'censored' in advance, since they coincide with the exigencies inscribed in those positions. As the principle underlying all the distinctive features of the dominant mode of expression, *relaxation in tension* is the expression of a relation to the market which can only be acquired through prolonged and precocious familiarity with markets that are characterized, even under ordinary circumstances, by a high level of control and by that constantly sustained attention to forms and formalities which defines the 'stylization of life'.

It is certainly true that, as one rises in the social order, the degree of censorship and the correlative prominence given to the imposition of form and euphemization increase steadily, not only on public or official occasions (as is the case among the lower classes and especially among the petite bourgeoisie, who establish a marked opposition between the ordinary and the extra-ordinary), but also in the routines of everyday life. This can be seen in styles of dressing or eating, but also in styles of speaking, which tend to exclude the casualness, the laxness or the licence which we allow ourselves in other circumstances, when we are 'among our own kind'. That is what Lakoff notes indirectly when he observes that the kind of behaviour among friends, where someone asks openly about the price of an object ('Hey, that's a nice rug. What did it cost?'), which would be acceptable among the lower classes (where it might even seem like a compliment), would be 'misplaced' in the bourgeoisie, where it would have to be given an attenuated form ('May I ask you what the rug cost?').<sup>24</sup>

Linked to this higher degree of censorship, which demands a consistently higher degree of euphemization and a more systematic effort to *observe formalities*, is the fact that the practical mastery of the instruments of euphemization which are objectively demanded

on the markets with the greatest tension, like the academic market or the high-society market, increases as one rises in the social order, i.e. with the increased frequency of the social occasions (from childhood on) when one finds oneself subject to these demands, and therefore able to acquire practically the means to satisfy them. Thus bourgeois usage is characterized, according to Lakoff, by the use of what he calls *hedges*, e.g. 'sort of', 'pretty much', 'rather', 'strictly speaking', 'loosely speaking', 'technically', 'regular', 'par excellence', etc., and, according to Labov, by intensive use of what he calls *filler phrases*, e.g. 'such a thing as', 'some things like that', 'particularly'.<sup>25</sup> It is not enough to say, as Labov does (with a view to rehabilitating popular speech, which leads him simply to invert the system of values), that these expressions are responsible for the *verbosity* and verbal inflation of bourgeois speech. Though superfluous in terms of a strict economy of communication, they fulfil an important function in determining the value of a way of communicating. Not only does their very redundancy bear witness to the extent of the available resources and the disinterested relation to those resources which is therefore possible, but they are also elements of a *practical metalanguage* and, as such, they function as marks of the *neutralizing distance* which is one of the characteristics of the bourgeois relation to language and to the social world. Having the effect, as Lakoff puts it, of 'heightening intermediate values and toning down extreme values', or, as Labov says, of 'avoiding all error and exaggeration', these expressions are an affirmation of the speaker's capacity to keep his distance from his own utterances, and therefore his own interests – and, by the same token, from those who cannot keep such a distance but let themselves be carried away by their own words, surrendering without restraint or censorship to their expressive impulse. Such a mode of expression, which is produced by and for markets requiring 'axiological neutrality' (and not only in language use), is also adjusted in advance to markets which require that other form of neutralization and distancing of reality (and distancing of the other classes which are immersed in it) which compromises the stylization of life: that forming of practices which gives priority in all things to manner, style and form, to the detriment of function. It is also suited to all formal markets and to social rituals where the need to impose form and to observe formalities, which defines the appropriate form of language – i.e. *formal language* – is absolutely imperative and prevails to the detriment of the communicative function, which can disappear as long as the performative logic of symbolic domination operates.



It is no coincidence that bourgeois distinction invests the same intention in its relation to language as it invests in its relation to the body. The sense of acceptability which orients linguistic practices is inscribed in the most deep-rooted of bodily dispositions: it is the whole body which responds by its posture, but also by its inner reactions or, more specifically, the articulatory ones, to the tension of the market. Language is a body technique, and specifically linguistic, especially phonetic, competence is a dimension of bodily hexis in which one's whole relation to the social world, and one's whole socially informed relation to the world, are expressed. There is every reason to think that, through the mediation of what Pierre Guiraud calls 'articulatory style', the bodily hexis characteristic of a social class determines the system of phonological features which characterizes a class pronunciation. The most frequent articulatory position is an element in an overall way of using the mouth (in talking but also in eating, drinking, laughing, etc.) and therefore a component of the bodily hexis, which implies a *systematic informing* of the whole phonological aspect of speech. This 'articulatory style', a life-style 'made flesh', like the whole bodily hexis, welds phonological features – which are often studied in isolation, each one (the phoneme 'r', for example) being compared with its equivalent in other class pronunciations – into an indivisible totality which must be treated as such.

Thus, in the case of the lower classes, articulatory style is quite clearly part of a relation to the body that is dominated by the refusal of 'airs and graces' (i.e., the refusal of stylization and the imposition of form) and by the valorization of virility – one aspect of a more general disposition to appreciate what is 'natural'. Labov is no doubt right when he ascribes the resistance of male speakers in New York to the imposition of the legitimate language to the fact that they associate the idea of virility with their way of speaking or, more precisely, their way of using the mouth and throat when speaking. In France, it is surely no accident that popular usage condenses the opposition between the bourgeois relation and the popular relation to language in the sexually over-determined opposition between two words for the mouth: *la bouche*, which is more closed, pinched, i.e. tense and censored, and therefore feminine, and *la gueule*, unashamedly wide open, as in 'split' (*fendue*, *se fendre la gueule*, 'split oneself laughing'), i.e. relaxed and free, and therefore masculine.<sup>26</sup> Bourgeois dispositions, as they are envisaged in the popular mind, and in their most caricatured, petit-bourgeois form, convey in their physical postures of tension and exertion (*bouche fine*, *pinçée*, *levres*

*pinçées*, *serrées*, *du bout des lèvres*, *bouche en cul-de-poule* – to be fastidious, supercilious, 'tight-lipped') the bodily indices of quite general dispositions towards the world and other people (and particularly, in the case of the mouth, towards food), such as haughtiness and disdain (*faire la fine bouche*, *la petite bouche* – to be fussy about food, difficult to please), and the conspicuous distance from the things of the body and those who are unable to mark that distance. *La gueule*, by contrast, is associated with the manly dispositions which, according to the popular ideal, are rooted in the calm certainty of strength which rules out censorships – prudence and deviousness as well as 'airs and graces' – and which make it possible to be 'natural' (*la gueule* is on the side of nature), to be 'open' and 'outspoken' (*jouer franc-jeu*, *avoir son franc-parler*) or simply to sulk (*faire la gueule*). It designates a capacity for verbal violence, identified with the sheer strength of the voice (*fort en gueule*, *coup de gueule*, *grande gueule*, *engueuler*, *s'engueuler*, *gueuler*, *aller gueuler* – 'loud-mouthed', a 'dressing-down', 'bawl', 'have a slanging match', 'mouth-off'). It also designates a capacity for the physical violence to which it alludes, especially in insults (*casser la gueule*, *mon poing sur la gueule*, *ferme ta gueule* – 'smash your face in', 'a punch in the mouth', 'shut your face'), which, through the *gueule*, regarded both as the 'seat' of personal identity (*bonne gueule*, *sale gueule* – 'nice guy', 'ugly mug') and as its main means of expression (consider the meaning of *ouvrir sa gueule*, or *l'ouvrir*, as opposed to *la fermer*, *la boucler*, *taire sa gueule*, *s'écrouser* – 'say one's piece', as opposed to 'shut it', 'belt up', 'shut your mouth', 'pipe down'), aims at the very essence of the interlocutor's social identity and self-image. Applying the same 'intention' to the site of food intake and the site of speech output, the popular vision, which has a clear grasp of the unity of habitus and bodily hexis, also associates *la gueule* with the frank acceptance (*s'en foutre plein la gueule*, *se rincer la gueule* – stuffing oneself with food and drink) and frank manifestation (*se fendre la gueule*) of elementary pleasure.<sup>27</sup>

On the one hand, domesticated language, censorship made natural, which proscribes 'gross' remarks, 'coarse' jokes and 'thick' accents, goes hand in hand with the domestication of the body which excludes all excessive manifestations of appetites or feelings (exclamations as much as tears or sweeping gestures), and which subjects the body to all kinds of discipline and censorship aimed at denaturalizing it. On the other hand, the 'relaxation of articulatory tension', which leads, as Bernard Laks has pointed out, to the dropping of the final 'r' and 'l' (and which is probably not so much an



effect of *laissez-aller*<sup>28</sup> as the expression of a refusal to 'overdo it', to conform too strictly on the points most strictly demanded by the dominant code, even if the effort is made in other areas), is associated with rejection of the censorship which propriety imposes, particularly on the tabooed body, and with the outspokenness whose daring is less innocent than it seems since, in reducing humanity to its common nature – belly, bum, bollocks, grub, guts and shit – it tends to turn the social world upside down, arse over head. Popular festivity as described by Bakhtin and especially revolutionary crisis highlight, through the verbal explosion which they facilitate, the pressure and repression which the everyday order imposes, particularly on the dominated class, through the seemingly insignificant constraints and controls of politeness which, by means of the stylistic variations in ways of talking (the formulae of politeness) or of bodily deportment in relation to the degree of objective tension of the market, exacts recognition of the hierarchical differences between the classes, the sexes and the generations.

It is not surprising that, from the standpoint of the dominated classes, the adoption of the dominant style is seen as a denial of social and sexual identity, a repudiation of the virile values which constitute class membership. That is why women can identify with the dominant culture without cutting themselves off from their class as radically as men. 'Opening one's big mouth' (*ouvrir sa grande gueule*) means refusing to submit, refusing to 'shut it' (*la fermer*) and to manifest the signs of docility that are the precondition of mobility. To adopt the dominant style, especially a feature as marked as the legitimate pronunciation, is in a sense doubly to negate one's virility because the very fact of acquiring it requires docility, a disposition imposed on women by the traditional sexual division of labour (and the traditional division of sexual labour), and because this docility leads one towards dispositions that are themselves perceived as effeminate.

In drawing attention to the articulatory features which, like the degree of 'aperture', sonority or rhythm, best express, in their own logic, the deep-rooted dispositions of the habitus and, more precisely, of the bodily hexis, spontaneous sociolinguistics demonstrates that a differential phonology should never fail to select and interpret the articulatory features characteristic of a class or class fraction in relation not only to the other systems with reference to which they take on their distinctive value, and therefore their social value, but also in relation to the synthetic unity of the bodily hexis from which they spring, and by virtue of which they represent the ethical or

aesthetic expression of the necessity inscribed in a social condition.

The linguist, who has developed an abnormally acute perception (particularly at the phonological level), may notice differences where ordinary speakers hear none. Moreover, because he has to concentrate on discrete criteria (such as the dropping of the final 'r' or 't') for the purposes of statistical measurement, he is inclined towards an analytical perception very different in its logic from the ordinary perception which underlies the classificatory judgements and the delimitation of homogeneous groups in everyday life. Not only are linguistic features never clearly separated from the speaker's whole set of social properties (bodily hexis, physiognomy, cosmetics, clothing), but phonological (or lexical, or any other) features are never clearly separated from other levels of language; and the judgement which classifies a speech form as 'popular' or a person as 'vulgar' is based, like all practical predication, on sets of indices which never impinge on consciousness in that form, even if those which are designated by stereotypes (such as the 'peasant' 'r' or the southern *ceusse*) have greater weight.

The close correspondence between the uses of the body, of language and no doubt also of time is due to the fact that it is essentially through bodily and linguistic disciplines and censorships, which often imply a temporal rule, that groups inculcate the virtues which are the transfigured form of their necessity, and to the fact that the 'choices' constitutive of a relationship with the economic and social world are incorporated in the form of durable frames that are partly beyond the grasp of consciousness and will.<sup>29</sup>